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The rules laid down in the older cases as to what territorial limits were in
restraint of trade seem to have been abandoned to a large extent. The test
usually applied in the later cases is whether the territory is greater in extent
than that which is reasonably necessary to adequately protect the business. 1 2
Since the territory in the case under scrutiny was limited to the counties in
which the defendant had worked, the territory embraced was obviously
reasonable.
The question of time is also decided by the rule of reasonableness. If the
time provided in the contract is longer than is reasonably necessary to enable
the employer to secure his interests from the competition of his former
employee, the covenant becomes unduly restrictive of the employe's rights and
the courts may refuse to enforce it for that reason. Whether the time is
reasonable depends entirely upon the particular circumstance of the case.
Many cases, quite similar in facts to the instant case, have enforced restrictions
of a more limited time.1 3 There are numerous other cases, quite similar
as to facts, however, where the time restriction was much longer.14
It might be argued that the injury to the plaintiff's business caused by the
defendant's competition could be rather accurately measured and so the in-
junctive remedy need not be resorted to. However, if an opposite result were
reached, any competitor in a business such as this might induce a particularly
successful or popular salesman to leave his employer and enter the employment
of the competitor. This would enable the competitor to benefit from the
expenses incurred in training the salesman and at the same time not give the
former employer opportunity to protect his business in case of such contingency.
H. S. C.
BANKS AND BANKING-PRIORITY OF PUBLIC FUND DEPosrrs IN INSOLVENT
BANK.-Wells County Bank qualified as a public depository and therein were
deposited state funds derived from sale of automobile license plates. Upon the
insolvency of the bank, the state claims a preference to these funds over other
creditors. The court held that the state had no preference, the court settling
the question as to whether a claim due to the state, by reason of its sovereignty,
is entitled to a preference over all other creditors by referring to a case
previously decided in Indiana; the state, however, was given preference on
grounds not pertinent to the question here discussed.1
141 At. 542; Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long (1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W.
412; Samuels Stores, Inc. v. Abrams (1919), 94 Conn. 248, 108 At. 541.
12 Kinney v. Scarbrough Co. (1912), 138 Ga. 77, 74 S. E. 772; 9 A. L. R.
1473; 1 Page, Contract, sec. 376-379.
13 Duerling v. City Baking Co. (1928), 155 Md. 280, 141 At. 542 (3
months); A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg (19 ), 101 N. J. Eq. 544, 139 At.
408 (1 year-clothing business); Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co. (1927),
81 Colo. 254, 254 Pac. 990 (6 months).
14 Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson (1927, Tex. Civ. App.), 300
S. W. 107, (3 years-within 5 squares of routes upon which employee had
worked); Granger v. Craven (1924), 159 Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10 (3 years-
within a town of 20,000 and 20 miles thereof); Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long
(1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (2 years).
1 State ex rel. Symons, Bank Commissioner v. Wells County Bank et al.
(1935), 196 N. E. 873 (Ind.).
RECENT CASE NOTES
There is no dispute as to whether or not the United States Government has
priority rights to fands whch it had deposited in an insolvent state bank or
an insolvent national bank, and there is no dispute as to whether or not the
state has prioriy zights for funds which it had deposited in insolvent national
banks. A federal statate pyovides that whenever any person who is indebted to
the United States Government becomes insolvent, all claims due to the
Government shall first be satisfied.2 Under this statute the claims of the
Umted States Government against insolvent state banks take preference. 3 But
due to the peculiar wordtag of the National Banking Act, the Federal Govern-
ment does not have a preitrence to federal funds deposited in a national bank.4
When state funds are deposted in national banks, the state is not entitled to a
preference, even thobgh a state statute provides otherwise;5 but a national
bank Is authorized to give security for the state deposits, and the state law
determines such precedure 0 However, it is when we consider the preference
of the state to funds which it had deposited in a bank other than a national
bank, which bank thereafter becomes insolvent, that the great dispute arises.
By reason of the dec on in the instant case, and the authority to which the
court referred, it may be concluded that the State of Indiana does not take
a preference over other creditors in the assets of an insolvent state bank in
liquidation for funds which it had deposited there.7 If, however, the deposit
were a wrongful one, it will leave open a door through which the courts can
establish the doctrine of a constructive trust in favor of the state, and permit
the state to take precedence in the distribution of assets.8 An examination
of cases in point in other states will reveal that the question is one in which
the courts are not in general accord. Of those courts who hold that the state
is entitled to preference, the majority argue that the state adopted the common
law as it existed in England insofar as it was not local in nature and applicable
to the conditions of the people and not incompatible with our political institu-
tions. As a consequence, the state must have adopted that part of the common
law which gave to the British Crown a priority in payment of debts due it
from an insolvent debtor, as against other creditors not having a specific lien. 9
2 Rev. Stat., sec. 3466. 2 Fed. Stat. Ann. 45, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 191.
3 U. S. v. State Bank of N. C. (1832), 6 Pet. (31 U. S.) 29, 8 L. ed. 308.
4 Rev. Stat., sec. 5236, 5 Fed. Stat. Ann. 176.
5 First National Bank v. Selden (1903), 120 Fed. 212, 56 C. C. A. 532
(Ill.); Palto Alto County v. Ulrich (1924), 199 Iowa 1, 201 N. W. 132;
Fiman v. State of S. D (1929), 29 Fed. (2nd) 776 (S. D.); Old Companies
Lehigh, Inc v. Meeker (1934), 71 Fed (2nd) 280 (N. Y.); Webster v. U. S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1934), 71 Fed. (2nd) 475 (Miss.); Spradlin v.
Royal Mfg. Co. (1934), 73 Fed. (2nd) 776 (N. C.).
6 12 U. S. C. A., sec. 90; Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Kokrda (1933),
66 Fed. (2nd) 641 (Colo).
7 Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Brucker et al. (1933), 205 Ind. 273,
183 N. E. 668. Cf. Burns (1933) 61-810, which provides that the State
Treasurer, to the extent that it shall have paid off the loss of public deposits,
shall be entitled to subrogation, "and shall share in the distribution of the
assets of such closed depository on such basis ratably with other depositors."
8 State ex rel. Symons Bank Commissioner v. Wells County Bank et al.
(1935), 196 N. E. 873 (Ind.); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935), Vol. 1,
sec. 21; Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 1, sec. 15(h).
9People ex rel. Nelson v. Marion Trust and Savings Bank (1932), 34-7
I1. 445, 179 N. E. 893.
"At common law." said Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Marshall v. N. Y., 254
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The courts following the common law rule would say that where statutes do
exist, they are simply a codification of the common law rule.1 0 A few deci-
sions announce the principle that a bank is the trustee of public funds,11 but
this position is legally difficult to support.12 It is not contemplated by either
the public depositor or the bank that the latter is to keep the money with which
to meet public checks segregated from the other deposits of money; in other
words, there is no definite res to which the trust can attach, and instead of a
trust relationship a simple debtor-creditor relationship is established. 1 3 And
if the deposit is made by an officer who is deemed to be trustee of the public
funds, there is no reason for changing the above rule. 1 4 On the other hand
are those cases which refuse the state priority in the distribution of the assets
of an insolvent bank, the theories behind the result being almost as numerous
as the cases themselves.1 5 Among the reasons given by the courts are these:
(1) No right ever existed at common law which would give the state prefer-
U. S. 380, 65 L. ed. 315, "the Crown of Great Britain, by virtue of a preroga-
tive right, had priority over all subjects for the payment out of a debtor's
property of all debts due it. The priority was effective alike whether the
property remained in the hands of the debtor, or had been placed in the
possession of a third person, or was in custodia legis. The priority could be
defeated or postponed only through the passing of title to the debtor's prop-
erty, absolutely or by way of lien, before the sovereign sought to enforce
his right."
People v. Farmer's State Bank (1929), 335 Il1. 617, 167 N. E. 804;
People v. West Englewood Trust and Savings Bank (1933), 353 I1. 451, 187
N. E. 525; State Bank of Commerce v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1930),
28 S. W. (2nd) 184; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Carnegie Trust
Co. (1914), 146 N. Y. S. 804, affd. 213 N. Y. 629, 107 N. E. 1087; State
ex rel. Rankin v. Madison State Bank (1923), 68 Mont. 342, 218 Pac. 652;
Aetna Accident and Life Co. v. Miller (1918), 54 Mont. 377, 170 Pac. 760;
Woodyard v. Sayre (1922), 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689; U. S. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co. v. Central Trust Co. (1924), 95 W. Va. 458, 121 S. E. 430;
Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullins (1930), 107 W. Va. 679, 150 S. E. 221;
Fidelity etc. Co. v. Rainey (1908), 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397; Fidelity
and Deposit Co. of Md. v. State Bank of Portland (1926), 117 Ore. 1, 242
Pac. 823; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell (1923), 108 Ore.
261, 217 Pac. 332; State v. State Bank (1848), 6 Gill and J. (Md.) 205; State
v. Foster (1895), 5 Wyo. 199, 38 Pac. 926; Robinson v. Bank of Darien
(1855), 18 Ga. 65; Booth v. State (1909), 131 Ga. 750, 63 S. E. 502; Central
Bank & Trust Co. v. State (1912), 139 Ga. 54, 76 S. E. 587; Fogg v. Friar's
Point Bank (1902), 80 Miss. 750, 32 S. 285; Metcalfe v. Merchants etc.
Bank (1906), 89 Miss. 649, 41 S. 377; U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. v. Shaw First
State Bank (1913), 103 Miss. 91, 60 S. 47; In re Marathon Savings Bank
(1924), 198 Iowa 696, 196 N. W. 729, 200 N. W. 199; In re So. Phila. State
Bank's Insolvency (1929), 295 Pa. 433, 145 At. 520; Fimon v. S. D. 1929),
29 Fed. (2nd) 776, 279 U. S. 841.
10 Iowa Code Supplement (1913), sec. 3825(a); Miss. Code (1906), see.
3485; S. C. Code (1902), sec. 2538; 17 Marquette L. Rev. (1933) 213.
Contra: State v. Harris (1832), 18 S. C. (2 Bailey) 598; also, Campion v.
Village of Graceville (1930), 181 Minn. 446, 232 N. W. 917.
11State v. Midland State Bank (1897), 52 Nebr. 1, 71 N. W. 1011;
Sorenson v. First Natl. Bank (1932), 122 Nebr. 502, 24 N. W. 747; Watts
v. Cleveland County (1908), 21 Okla. 231, 95 Pac. 771; Md. Casualty Co. v.
McConnel (1924), 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W. 410.
12 (1932) 2 Idaho L. J. 57.
13 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935), Vol. 1, sec. 21, and cases cited.
14 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935), Vol. 1, sec. 21, and cases cited.
15 (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 530.
RECENT CSE NOTES
ence.
1 6 (2) Even though the right did exist at common law, it was inconsistent
with the cardinal concepts of free government and would not be adopted by
the particular state. 1 7 This the state, with perfect propriety, had the right
to do, since the adoption of the common law in this country was left to the
states to determine. 1 8  (3) The state in depositing public funds was acting
in its business or proprietary capacity; it had stepped down into the arena of
common business, and by so doing, the state was not entitled to the preference
of the sovereign.19 It has been observed in refutation, however, that since the
power to deposit money for safekeeping must be a-necessary incident to the
collection and disbursement of public funds, the exercise of the power should
still be recognized as sovereign. 20  (4) By the enactment of the depository
laws and the requirement that the bank furnish security for the state deposits,
the rule for giving the state preference fell with the reason,2 1 and the state was
said to have waived or abrogated its priority right.2 2 Although the argument.
is made that the surety company furnishing the security may itself become
insolvent thus necessitating the continuance of the preference, 2 3 and although
it may be argued that the court has no right to disregard the common law
rule of preference without a necessary implication or an express waiver by
the legislature,2 4 it is submitted that the courts reasoning is nevertheless one
16 Board of County Commissioners v. McFerson (1932), 90 Colo. 408, 9
Pac. (2nd) 614.
17 Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Union Savings Bank Co. (1928),
119 Ohio 124, 162 N. E. 420; Commissioner of Banking v. Chelsea Savings
Bank (1910), 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424, 127 N. W. 351; Chosen Free-
holders v. State Bank (1878), 29 N. J. Eq. 268, affd. N. J. Eq. 311; N. C.
Corp. Comm. v Citizens Bank and Trust Co. (1927), 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E.
587; Lake Worth etc. v. First American Bank and Trust Co. (1929), 97
Fla. 174, 120 S. 316; Denny v. Thompson (1931), 236 Ky. 714, 33 S. W.
(2nd) 670; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Carter (1933), - Va. -, 170
S. E. 764.
18 N. C. Corp. Comm. v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. (1927), 193 N. C.
513, 137 S. E. 587; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 659.
19 National Surety Co. v. Morris (1925), 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac. 1063;
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Union Savings Bank Co. (1928), 119
Ohio 124, 162 N. E. 420; Campion v. Village of Graceville (1930), 181 Minn.
446, 232 N. W. 917; State v. Carlyon (1932), 166 Wash. 498, 7 Pac (2nd)
572. The court here said that "the state is bound by principles of equitable
estoppel, and in business relations with individuals must not expect more
favorable treatment than is fair between men." Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Rainwater, Bank Commissioner (1927), 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. W. 1003.
20 (1933) 81 Pa. L. Rev. 441.
21 U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. McFerson (1926), 78 Colo. 338,
241 Pac. 728.
22National Security Co. v. Morris (1925), 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac. 1063;
National Surety Co. v. Pixton (1922), 60 Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878; In re
Central Bank of Willcox (1922), 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915; In re Holland
Banking Co. (1926), 313 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. McFerson (1926), 78 Colo. 338, 241 Pac. 728; Shaw, Banking Com-
missioner v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1932), 48 S. W. (2nd) 974, 977;
State v. Carson Valley Bank (1933), 23 Pac. (2nd) 1105; Commonwealth v.
Commissioner of Banks (1922), 240 Mass. 244, 133 N. E. 625; Commissioner
of Banking v. Chelsea Savings Bank (1910), 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424,
127 N. W. 351.
23 Commissioners of San Miguel v. McFerson (1932), 90 Colo. 408, 9 Pac.
(2nd) 614.
24 Booth and Flinn v. Miller (1912), 237 Pa. 297, 85 AtI. 457.
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with a great deal of merit, since the primary purpose of priority in the first
place is for the safety of the public funds, and since this is achieved through
another method equally effective, priority in an insolvent bank's funds is no
longer necessary. (5) The right is lost when the title to the property vested in
another, as where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or
there was a receiver appointed before the state filed its claim. 25 This seems
logical enough, in view of the fact that the English Crown, who was entitled
to a preference, also lost it when the title was divested from the insolvent
debtor and vested in another.2 6 (6) When the state passed a statute providing
for the marshalling of claims, and nothing was stated in the statutes concerning
the state's preference, the state's preferential right was said to be abrogated. 2?
(7) Private depositors would be more likely to favor national banks for their
personal deposits, because the state, having no priority in the assets of an
insolvent national bank, but having priority in the assets of an insolvent state
bank, would cause a decrease in the available assets of the state bank on
which the private depositor could realize in case of the state bank's insolvency.
There would be no such decrease in the assets of an insolvent national bank.
2 8
Indiana seems to base its decision on the ground that whatever prerogative
was given by common law, it was a prerogative given to the King of England,
personally, and not one which was possessed by the state government; and
furthermore, even if it could be said that the priority was a prerogative
existing in favor of the state, the state in making its deposit was not exer-
cising its power as a sovereign, but was acting in a proprietary capacity.
2 9
In any event, whatever course the courts may pursue in determining whether
a state has preference, it is clear that the courts agree that if preference is to
be given, it should not extend to the political subdivisions of the state, in the
absence of a statute.3 0 This survey of the decisions in the states reveals
a difference of opinion as to whether a state should be given a preference in
the assets of an insolvent bank. Those states which allow the prerogative,
base the decision on ideas of public policy31-that it is essential to the public
welfare of the state that the state's funds be protected, and that the normal
governmental functions must not be impeded by abnormal business conditions.
Conceding this theory of public policy to be correct, in view of the fact that
the states now have depository laws and require the banks to give security
for its deposits, it is submitted that public policy has been effected by methods
other than granting a preference to the state; in a way which not only protects
25 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Moore (1919), 107 Wash. 99, 181
Pac. 40; Public Indemnity Co. v. Page (1931), 161 Md. 239, 156 At. 791;
State v. First State Bank (1917), 22 N. M. 661, 167 Pac. 3; State v. Peoples
Savings Bank and Trust Co. (1918), 23 N. M. 282, 168 Pac. 526.
26 Marshall v. N. Y. (1920), 254- U. S. 380, 65 L. ed. 315.
27 Basset v. City Bank and Trust Co. (1932), 115 Conn. 393, 161 At. 852.
28 In re Holland Banking Co. (1926), 317 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702.
29 Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Brucker et al. (1933), 205 Ind.
273, 183 N. E. 668.
30 (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 480; (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 692.
31 (1933) 17 Marq. L. Rev. 213; (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 480; (1933) 81 Pa. L.
Rev. 441; State ex rel. Rankin v. Madison State Bank (1923), 68 Mont. 342,
218 Pac. 652, where it was stated that giving the state preference "is based
upon public policy, in order that the state's funds may not be lost, but may
be available to meet governmental expenses and discharge the state's
obligations.
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the deposits of the state, but prevents an encroachment on the rights of the
citizens of the state to have an equal share in the recovery of their own funds
which they have deposited in the same bank that the state had deposited its
funds. It is not surprising, therefore, that although the reasons given by the
states denying a preference are manifold, they all arrive at the same result,
and, although admitting the common law prerogative, they will find a method
for denying a preference which they regard as unjustified. Although a few
years back the instant case may have been considered to be in the minority,8 2
so far as the writer is able to ascertain, the instant ease is now in accord with
the better and majority rule. H. B.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF STATE BOARD
OF TAX COMMISSIONRS.-Action by the City of Indianapolis to enjoin the
Auditor and Treasurer of Marion County from reducing the tax levy of the
city as ordered by the State Board of Tax Commissioners upon an appeal to
said commission pursuant to the provision of Sec. 200 of c. 95 of the Acts of
1927. (Burns' 1933, Sec. 64-1331.) The complaint alleges that the action
of the State Board of Tax Commissioners in making said reduction is illegal
and void in that the section of the act in question is unconsitutional, both as
to giving the state board authority (1) over municipal activities in regard to
those matters affecting the inhabitants in that community, and (2) as author-
izing such state board to exercise both legislative and judicial power in mat-
ters of taxation. The cause was tried by the Superior Court of Marion
County and judgment rendered enjoining the appellees from extending upon
the tax duplicates the reduced levies. Held, judgmnt reversed. The General
Assembly, in enacting tax laws, has authority to reserve a check upon munici-
palities levying taxes and assessments and to lodge supervisory control in a
state administrative board.1
A municipal corporation is a body politic created by the incorporation of the
people of a prescribed locality and invested with subordinate powers of legis-
lation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and
administer local and internal affairs of the community.2 The courts have
generally regarded a municipal corporation as a subordinate branch of the
government of the state and as an instrumentality of state administration for
conducting the affairs of the government.3 In legal theory the municipal
corporation is strictly public in character, the creature of the legislative power
of the state, whether that power is exercised directly, or by the state legislature.
From the principle that the legislative power of the state is the sole source
of its corporate life, follows the generally accepted rule that a municipal
32 (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 868; (1933) 17 Marq. L. Rev. 213.
1 Dunn v. City of Indianapolis (1935), 196 N. E. 528.
21 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1928, 2nd ed.), p. 369; 1 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations (1911, 5th ed.), p. 58; Schneck v. City of Jefferson-
ville (1898), 152 Ind. 204, 52 N. E. 215.
3 State v. Gullatt (1923), 210 Ala. 452, 98 So. 373, 376; Valley Rys. v.
Harrisburgh (1924), 280 Pa. 385, 124 At. 644, 648; Ottawa v. Carey (1883),
108 U. S. 110; Williams v. Eggleston (1898), 170 U. S. 304, 310; Trenton v.
New Jersey (1923), 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. ed. 937.
